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ABSTRACT 
 
Recursion or self-reference is a key feature of contemporary research and writing in semiotics. The 
paper commences by focusing on the role of recursion in poststructuralism. It is suggested that much 
of what passes for recursion in this field is in fact not recursive all the way down. After the paradoxi-
cal meaning of radical recursion is adumbrated, topology is employed to provide some examples. The 
properties of the Moebius strip prove helpful in bringing out the dialectical nature of radical recursion. 
The Moebius is employed to explore the recursive interplay of terms that are classically regarded as 
binary opposites: identity and difference, object and subject, continuity and discontinuity, etc. To real-
ize radical recursion in an even more concrete manner, a higher-dimensional counterpart of the 
Moebius strip is utilized, namely, the Klein bottle. The presentation concludes by enlisting phenome-
nological philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s concept of depth to interpret the Klein bottle’s extra 
dimension. 
 
1 SEMIOTICS, POSTSTRUCTURALISM, AND RECURSION 
 
In classical signification, the stability of the relationship between the signifier and what it 
signifies is maintained by preserving the anonymity of the former. Attention is fixed sole-
ly on the meanings that are signified, not on the act of signification itself. With the advent 
of semiotics this changes. Semiotics is the discipline that studies the process of significa-
tion. Here the sign becomes recursive; instead of focusing exclusively on signified mean-
ings, it comes to focus on itself. The signifier, which had played a predominantly tacit 
role in classical semiosis, is now itself explicitly signified. 
 Despite this role reversal inherent in the very existence of the discipline of semiotics, 
structuralist semioticians like Saussure still sought to preserve the invariance of the link 
between the given signifier and what it signifies. The problem is that, once classical sig-
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nification is surpassed by signifying the signifier, the door is opened to an infinite re-
gress. For now, it seems that no signifier is exempted from mutation into that which is 
signified. A new signifier is presumably needed to signify what had been the signifier, 
but this new signifier is subject to signification by a still newer signifier, and so on ad 
infinitum. And each time the tacit operation of the signifier is undermined by being ex-
plicitly signified, the functioning of what had been signified by that signifier is also af-
fected. Ultimately then, we have in this “hall of mirrors” neither signifier nor signified in 
any stable, abidingly meaningful form. 
Poststructuralist writing exemplifies the recursive “sliding” or “slippage” of the sig-
nifier. The approach of psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan is a prime illustration. For Lacan, 
language “is constituted by a set of signifiers” that involves what “I call the Other” 
(1966/1970: 193). The “otherness” of language results from the fact that, in its “chain of 
signifiers” (194), every act of self-reference, rather than affirming the identity of the self 
or subject that is referred to, always slips away into what is other, into a new and anony-
mous signifier. As Lacan puts it: 
 
All that is language is lent from this otherness and this is why the subject is always a fading 
thing that runs under the chain of signifiers. For the definition of a signifier is that it repre-
sents a subject not for another subject but for another signifier. This is the only definition 
possible of the signifier as different from the sign. The sign is something that represents 
something for somebody, but the signifier is something that represents a subject for another 
signifier. The consequence is that the subject disappears….” (1966/1970: 194) 
 
In this way, the sign—which had constituted for earlier semioticians a fixed relationship 
between a signifier and its signified meaning, with the subject operating stably behind the 
scenes (the “somebody” to which Lacan alludes)—now dissolves into an evanescent flux 
of differences wherein the subject loses its substance, becoming a “nobody,” a ghost-like 
quasi-presence. 
 Much the same process of dissolution is reflected in the deconstructionist writings of 
Jacques Derrida. In the “primary writing” (1976: 7) of which he speaks, “[s]ign will al-
ways lead to sign, one substituting the other...as signifier and signified in turn” (Spivak 
1976: xix). In Derrida’s own words, language must be understood as a field “of freeplay, 
that is to say, a field of infinite substitutions” (cited by Spivak 1976: xix) in which identi-
ty fragments into sheer difference (différance). The specific way this takes place is by the 
process of self-referential mirroring in which, time and again, the signifier is displaced by 
being made into what is signified by a newly implicit signifier. 
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 It seems clear that the slippage of the signifier results from the indefinite repetition 
of recursion. This is the nature of semiosis, we are told; it is a “mirror game” in which 
self-identity is perpetually subverted and we continually slide into otherness and differ-
ence. While I certainly agree with the general consensus among semioticians that sym-
bolic operations are inherently recursive, I propose that the infinite regress to which post-
structuralism is prone actually derives from its failure fully to achieve recursion. 
 Again, when the signifier “slips,” it becomes something that is now itself signified. 
Yet does this really constitute a concrete instance of self-signification, or does it merely 
entail the close juxtaposition of two semiotic acts neither of which are recursive in them-
selves? Initially, X signifies Y. Then there is the reversal of this in which X itself be-
comes signified by a new signifier, Z. This is obviously not to say that X signifies X. 
Poststructuralist “self-signification” then does not truly involve a signifier’s reference to 
itself within the same actual occasion, to use Whitehead’s (1978) term for a fundamental 
concrete event; it entails only a switching of roles between signifier and signified from 
one occasion to another. (No doubt occasions may follow each other in close succession 
and may be broadly construed as belonging to the “same” occurrence; but, on a more 
concrete level, the occasions of poststructuralism constitute distinct semiotic acts.) There-
fore, poststructuralist signification is not radically recursive, not recursive all the way 
down into the roots of semiosis, for the signifier of occasion 2 does not signify itself but 
only that which was the signifier on occasion 1. 
 If poststructuralism fails to meet the challenge of radical self-reference because its 
signification within the actual occasion is strictly a reference to what is other, does radi-
cal recursion involve reference to the self in the sense of simple self-identity (X≡X)? It 
surely cannot. For without the aspect of the other, of difference, meaning is trivialized 
and collapses. Radical recursion therefore entails neither external reference nor self-
identity. What it constitutes, I suggest, is the dialectical interplay of these. 
I propose that, in radical recursion, though the self that is signified is not simply the 
same self that does the signifying; though the very act of reflecting upon the self turns it 
into what is other; this other flows right back into the source from which it arises, rather 
than appearing merely as an other cast before a new self. The semiotic act I am intimating 
thus would give us neither self nor other, in the categorically opposed sense of these 
terms. We would realize instead their paradoxical interpenetration. I suggest that this dia-
lectic is what we require to supersede the supremacy of linear signification in a meaning-
ful way. Signifier and signified would be more than reciprocally interdependent in such a 
self-signification. They would be identical, utterly one. Yet they also would be two. By 
virtue of the latter aspect, meaningful signification would continue; by virtue of the for-
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mer, recursion would go all the way down; it would be realized concretely in the heart of 
the actual occasion. To be sure, this construal of radical recursion requires further expli-
cation. 
 
 
2 RADICAL RECURSION IN TOPOLOGY 
 
Psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan had turned to the science of linguistics in order to clarify 
the language of the psyche. What we see precisely in the slippage of the signifier through 
which the subject is “a fading thing” (1966/1970: 194) is the functioning of the uncon-
scious. But Lacan was not content to stop with a merely linguistic clarification of psychic 
process. In an effort to achieve an even higher level of precision, he appealed to mathe-
matics, and, in particular, to topology, the qualitative sub-discipline that deals with the 
properties of surfaces. By way of elucidating the signifying activity that constitutes the 
unconscious discourse of the human subject, Lacan presented a diagram of a Moebius 
strip: 
 
This diagram can be considered the basis of a sort of essential inscription at the origin, in the 
knot which constitutes the subject. This goes much further than you may think at first, be-
cause you can search for the sort of surface able to receive such inscriptions. You can per-
haps see that the sphere, that old symbol for totality, is unsuitable. A torus, a Klein bottle, a 
cross-cut surface, are able to receive such a cut. And this diversity is very important as it ex-
plains many things about the structure of mental disease. If one can symbolize the subject by 
this fundamental cut, in the same way one can show that a cut on a torus corresponds to the 
neurotic subject, and on a cross-cut surface to another sort of mental disease. (Lacan 
1966/1970: 192–193) 
 
Comparing the sphere and the Moebius strip, we can say that both are recursive, insofar 
as they both turn back upon themselves. But unlike “that old symbol for totality,” the 
Moebius possesses a “fundamental cut”; a knot, twist or gap. In Lacan’s view, this cut 
represents the division inherent in the subject that prevents it from realizing the self-
identity symbolized by the sphere. The cut functions like a crack in a mirror, leading the 
Moebius to signify itself in such a way that it distorts or displaces itself. Or, speaking di-
achronically, we can say that Moebius recursion is interrupted by the cut and we cut to a 
new occasion. In moving into the Moebius’s twist, the signifier we started with is twisted 
into that which is signified by a newly implicit signifier that is a “mirror image” of the 
original yet out of step with it. On Lacan’s reading then, the Moebius strip embodies the 
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self-alienating kind of recursion that falls short of what I have called radical recursion. I 
suggest, however, that there is a different way of reading the Moebius. To see how 
Moebius recursion can be grasped in the radical sense adumbrated above, let us look 
more closely at this curious topological structure. 
 We may bring out most effectively the dialectical character of the Moebius strip by 
comparing it to a non-dialectical structure more similar to it than is the sphere: the cylin-
drical ring (see Rosen 1994, 2004a). 
 
         
                             Figure 1. Cylindrical ring (a) and Moebius strip (b) 
 
A cylindrical ring (Fig. 1a) is constructed by cutting out a narrow strip of paper and join-
ing the ends. The surface of Moebius (Fig. 1b) is produced by giving one end of such a 
strip a half twist (through an angle of 180°) before linking it with the other. The cylindri-
cal ring possesses the familiar property of two-sidedness: at any point along its surface, 
two distinct sides can be identified. Commencing on either side, rotation about the ring 
traces out a circle of simple self-return like that found on the sphere. The two-sidedness 
of the cylinder of course precludes continuous passage from one side to the other. Such a 
transition is inevitably cut short at the surface’s edge; the singularity we encounter there 
tells us that we cannot reach the far side without a break in contact, a cut to a new occa-
sion. We are therefore able to say that, whereas rotation about a single side of the two-
sided ring signifies the simply continuous affirmation of self-identity, passage between 
sides expresses a simply discontinuous cut to what is other. 
  Now, in the case of the Moebius strip, it is true that if you place your index finger 
anywhere on the surface, you will be able to put your thumb on a corresponding point on 
the opposite side. The Moebius strip does have two sides, like the cylinder. But this only 
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holds for the local cross-section of the strip defined by thumb and forefinger. Taking the 
full length of the strip into account, we discover that points on opposite sides are inti-
mately connected—they can be thought of as twisting or dissolving into each other con-
tinuously, as being bound up internally. Accordingly, mathematicians define such pairs of 
points as single points, and the two sides of the Moebius strip as but one side. 
I want to emphasize that the Moebius surface is not one-sided in the homogeneous 
sense of a single side of the cylindrical ring. It is one-sided in the paradoxical sense, one-
sided and also two-sided, for the local distinction between sides is not just negated with 
expansion to the Moebius as a whole. In coming to interpenetrate each other, the sides do 
not merely lose their distinct identities. And yet, though the sides remain different, they 
also become one and the same. Thus, if the cylindrical ring embodies the dualism of iden-
tity and difference, of continuity and discontinuity, the Moebius strip signifies their dia-
lectical entwinement. We can say as well that while the cylinder dualistically expresses 
both trivial recursion (through movement on a single side) and non-recursion (through 
passage to the other side), the Moebius models radical recursion. 
 Let us focus on the unique recursive action of the Moebius. With 360° of rotation 
about this surface, we appear to return to our point of origin. But this return is in fact also 
a departure, since, instead of remaining on the same side of the strip as in the case of cy-
lindrical rotation, we are carried to the opposite side. So Moebius recursion incorporates 
an element of discontinuity not evident in its cylindrical counterpart. It is this distinctive 
feature that Lacan picked up on in contrasting the Moebius with the sphere. What Lacan 
apparently missed is that the discontinuity of the Moebius, its twist or cut—unlike the cut 
required in passing from one side of the cylinder to the other—is also continuous.  It is in 
glossing over the paradox of Moebius recursion that Lacan stopped short of radical recur-
sion. Lacan was apparently unable to recognize that the Moebius signifier does not mere-
ly short-circuit its reference to itself by prematurely cutting away from itself to an alter-
self operative on a new occasion. Rather, the Moebius signification of self as other (and 
other as self) transpires within the same concrete occasion thereby surpassing the dualism 
of self and other. 
 The application of Moebius topology has been taken up by thinkers with diverse ori-
entations and disciplinary backgrounds. From a feminist perspective emphasizing embod-
iment, theorist Elizabeth Grosz expands on Lacan’s use of the Moebius by portraying it 
as expressing “the inflection of mind into body and body into mind” (1994: xii). Anthro-
pologist Peter Harries-Jones (2002) suggests that the paradoxical link between culture 
and environment as understood by Bateson is best depicted in the form of a Moebius 
strip. Communications philosopher Brian Massumi (carrying forward Deleuze and Guat-
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tari’s call for a “topology of multiplicities” [1987: 483]) demonstrates the need to recon-
ceive human transactions via a “strange one-sided topology” that recursively surmounts 
the old dichotomies by working at a “paradoxically creative edge” (1998). Semiotician 
Floyd Merrell (1998) uses the paradox of the Moebius to model C. S. Peirce’s concept of 
abduction. And philosopher Yair Neuman—in this issue of SEED—applies the Moebius 
to the structure of boundary events in semiotic systems. (My own work with the Moebius 
dates back to the 1970s; see Rosen 1994.) In these writings, sustained emphasis on para-
dox allows the authors to surmount Lacanian “slippage” and employ Moebius topology to 
question effectively “the binary oppositions…[of] mind/body, nature/culture, sub-
ject/object and interior/exterior” (Grosz 1994: 164). 
It is all too easy, however, to lose one’s paradoxical edge. This is evidenced in Grosz 
and Massumi when—after using topology to successfully challenge binary opposition on 
one level of analysis, they appear to fall prey to it on another. Thus, in the case of certain 
root philosophical oppositions that implicitly structure their thinking—such as the one 
and the many, identity and difference, being and becoming—they wind up privileging 
“the fields of difference, the trajectories of becoming” (Grosz 1994: 210). The “one-
sidedness” of such a reaction to the totalizing propensities of structuralism (and classico-
modernism in general) is certainly not of the Moebius kind. Instead of genuinely ques-
tioning the categorial purity of the old approach by consistently applying topological par-
adox to the most basic philosophical dichotomies, there is a slippage into a sort of “re-
verse purism” (Rosen, 2004b). Pure identity (totality, unity, being, continuity, etc.) is 
supplanted by a mode of difference every bit as pure: Derridean différance. It is in the 
process of unambiguously affirming one member of the philosophical binary over the 
other that the Moebius edge is lost. So what I am proposing is that the application of top-
ological paradox needs to be implemented in a consistent and thoroughgoing manner all 
the way down. From my own experience, I know how difficult this is to achieve and it 
would not surprise me to learn that I myself lose my edge in places in this very text. As a 
dweller in a “glass house,” I must be careful then about the “stones” I hurl. We are all 
challenged to avoid limiting our applications of topological paradox to the surface of our 
discourse while allowing our deepest assumptions and forms of expression to remain tac-
itly governed by the system of binary logic that has controlled our thinking for so many 
centuries. To keep our topological edge all the way down and thus achieve radical recur-
sion, we must consistently exceed mere “logics of presence or position” and employ 
“qualitative topologics,” as Massumi (1998) so well puts it. 
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3 THE KLEIN BOTTLE 
 
I must now acknowledge a limitation in the Moebius expression of radical recursion. The 
Moebius does effectively signify the dialectic of continuity and discontinuity. In travers-
ing the twist, we depart from the circle of self-identity associated with continuous rota-
tion about a single side of the cylindrical ring, and we make the transition to the other 
side of the surface, which, when enacted on the cylinder, brings simple discontinuity. 
Yet, in the Moebius case, the departure from cylindrical continuity happens continuously. 
However, the discontinuous aspect of the Moebius dialectic is in fact something of an 
abstraction. While the effect of discontinuity is surely created in passing through the twist 
to the far side, there is never any true cut or break, as occurs when actually crossing an 
edge. The Moebius therefore signifies the continuity-discontinuity dialectic in a continu-
ous way; the discontinuous element is symbolized but not concretely embodied. I suggest 
that, for a full-fledged realization of the radically recursive dialectic, we require a topo-
logical structure in which continuity and discontinuity are interwoven not merely in effect 
but in actual fact. 
There exists a higher-dimensional counterpart of the Moebius surface. By way of in-
troduction, consider an interesting attribute of the Moebius: its asymmetry. Unlike the 
cylindrical ring, the Moebius has a definite orientation in space; it can be produced either 
in a left- or right-handed form (depending on the direction in which it is twisted). If both 
a left- and right-oriented Moebius surface were constructed and then "glued together," 
superimposed on one another point for point, a Klein bottle would result (Lacan’s passing 
allusion to this topological structure is cited above). 
                                                    
Figure 2.  The Klein bottle 
 
The Klein bottle (Fig. 2) has the same property of asymmetric one-sidedness as the two-
dimensional Moebius surface but incorporates an added dimension (Rosen 1994). Note, 
however, that we cannot actually produce a continuous model of this curious container, 
for left- and right-facing Moebius bands cannot be superimposed on each other in three-
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dimensional space without tearing the surfaces. Therefore, while each Moebius enantio-
morph is continuous within itself, joining these mirror twins to form a Klein bottle brings 
discontinuity. 
The feature of Kleinian discontinuity can be illustrated by means of a different but 
mathematically equivalent way of making the bottle. Once again a comparison is called 
for. 
               
Figure 3. Construction of torus (upper row) and Klein bottle (lower row) 
 
 Both rows of Figure 3 depict the progressive closing of a tubular surface that initially is 
open. In the upper row, the end circles of the tube are joined in the conventional way, 
brought together through the three-dimensional space outside the body of the tube to pro-
duce a doughnut-shaped form technically known as a torus (a higher-order analogue of 
the cylindrical ring). By contrast, the end circles in the lower row are superimposed from 
inside the body of the tube, an operation requiring the tube to pass through itself. This 
results in the formation of the Klein bottle. Indeed, if the structure so produced were cut 
in half, the halves would be Moebius bands of opposite handedness. But in three-
dimensional space, no structure can penetrate itself without cutting a hole in its surface. 
So, from a second standpoint, we see that the continuous construction of a Klein bottle 
cannot be carried out in the three dimensions available to us. The Klein bottle thus seems 
to possess the element of concrete discontinuity missing from its lower-dimensional 
Moebius counterpart. Whereas the twist in the Moebius mediates the transition from one 
side of the surface to the other in a continuous fashion, the Kleinian passage from inside 
to outside requires a hole. Of course, a simply discontinuous structure will serve us no 
better than a simply continuous one if we are seeking to express the dialectic of continui-
ty and discontinuity. What is needed is a structure that embodies the paradoxical inter-
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weaving of continuity and discontinuity. And, in fact, the Klein bottle does just that, pro-
vided that we approach it in a truly dialectical way. 
 How does modernist mathematics approach the Klein bottle? Mathematicians cer-
tainly do not just accept the discontinuity of the Klein bottle. Instead they rely on the idea 
that a form that penetrates itself in a given number of dimensions can be produced with-
out cutting a hole by invoking an added dimension. The point is nicely illustrated by the 
mathematician Rudolph Rucker (1977). He asks us to imagine a species of "flatlanders" 
attempting to assemble a Moebius strip. Rucker shows that, since the space inhabited by 
these creatures would be limited to two dimensions, when they would try to make an ac-
tual model of the Moebius, they would be forced to cut a hole in it. Of course, no such 
problem arises for us human beings, who have full access to three dimensions. It is the 
continuous construction of the Klein bottle that seems problematic for us, since this 
would appear to require a fourth dimension, but, try as we might, we find no fourth di-
mension in which to execute the operation. For modernist mathematics, however, there is 
actually no problem. Although dimensions higher than the third may be unavailable to 
concrete experience, mathematicians feel free to proceed abstractly, calling forth as many 
extra dimensions as they wish. Added dimensions are summoned into being by extrapola-
tion from the known three-dimensionality of the physical world. This theoretical proce-
dure of dimensional proliferation presupposes that the nature of dimensionality itself is 
left unchanged. In the case of the Klein bottle, the "fourth dimension" required to com-
plete its formation remains an extensive continuum as is three-dimensional space, though 
the "higher” space is taken as "imaginary"; the Klein bottle, for its part, is regarded as an 
"imaginary object" embedded in this space. Enclosed as it is in the hypothesized four-
dimensional continuum, the imaginary Klein bottle itself is presumed simply continuous. 
Like the Moebius strip of three-dimensional space, it is thought to possess nary a hole. 
Now, in his phenomenological study of topology, the mathematician Stephen Barr 
advised that we should not be intimidated by the “higher mathematician....We must not 
be put off because he is interested only in the higher abstractions: we have an equal right 
to be interested in the tangible” (1964: 20). The tangible fact about the Klein bottle that is 
glossed over in the higher abstractions of modernist mathematics is its hole. Because the 
standard approach has always presupposed extensive continuity, it cannot come to terms 
with the inherent discontinuity of the Klein bottle created by its self-intersection. There-
fore, all too quickly, “higher” mathematics circumvents this hole by an act of abstraction 
in which the Klein bottle is treated as a closed object embedded in a hyper-dimensional 
continuum. To be sure, an “added dimension” is needed if the Klein bottle is not to be 
regarded as merely discontinuous. When limited to the three dimensions of ordinary 
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space, the Klein bottle cannot give expression to the dialectic of continuity and disconti-
nuity. But the “added dimension,” rather than being a continuum, must itself blend conti-
nuity and discontinuity. 
 In a continuum, all interactions occur between fixed terms that are externally related. 
The point elements of which the continuum is composed are themselves related in this 
manner. As philosopher Milič Čapek put it in his reflection on classical space, “no matter 
how minute a spatial interval may be, it must always be an interval separating two points, 
each of which is external to the other” (1961: 19). In the words of Martin Heidegger, the 
continuum is essentially constituted by the “‘outside-of-one-another’ of the multiplicity 
of points” (1927/1962: 481). Given the fundamental exteriority of classical space, rela-
tions among objects and events contained within it must also be external. In the continu-
um, systems “interact through forces that do not bring about any changes in their essen-
tial natures…[they interact] only through some kind of external contact” (Bohm 1980: 
173). Generally speaking then, the notion of the continuum implies that all boundaries are 
external in nature. This includes the point elements that bound space; the boundaries be-
tween and among interacting objects, systems, and events in space; and the figure-ground 
boundary that distinguishes an entity from its spatial context. 
One other kind of exterior boundary is implicit in the classico-modernist approach: 
the one that separates the object being observed from the subject that observes or analyz-
es it. Whereas objects are embedded in the extensive continuum, the subject entails dis-
continuity. In the language of Descartes, the object is res extensa and the subject res 
cogitans, thus unextended, not manifested in space. However, this distinction is compli-
cated by the subtlety of the continuum idea. The continuum actually possesses its own 
aspect of discontinuity. Even though the points composing space are packed densely to-
gether, because these points are related to one another externally, the continuum is infi-
nitely divisible; it can be indefinitely partitioned into ever smaller segments (the mathe-
matician Charles Muses was thus prompted to describe the continuum as actually consti-
tuting an “infinite discontinuum” [1968: 37]). It naturally follows that the objects embed-
ded in this medium are themselves partible; they can be rendered discontinuous. The dis-
continuity associated with the subject, on the other hand, signifies its transcendence of 
the continuum. So, whereas the breach one may produce in an object in fact reflects a 
property of the continuum, the subject constitutes a break with that continuum. Although 
it may rightly be said that classico-modernism favors continuity over discontinuity, what 
we are seeing is that there is indeed a place for discontinuity in the conventional para-
digm, albeit a tacit or negative one. At the deepest level, it is the division of continuity 
and discontinuity that classico-modernism upholds. 
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4 RADICAL RECURSION AND THE DIMENSION OF DEPTH 
 
The classical concept of dimension has prevailed from the time of Descartes and Kant to 
the physics and mathematics of today. In mainstream science and philosophy, the exteri-
ority of relations among objects in space, and between object and subject, has not been 
questioned in a fundamental way. Yet countercurrents do exist. We find evidence of these 
in the works of process-oriented thinkers such as Heidegger (1962/1972), Gendlin and 
Lemke (1983), and Bateson (see Neuman’s topological interpretation of Bateson in this 
issue of SEED, and Harries-Jones’s [1995] account of Bateson’s recursive vision); in 
each case, internal dynamics are given precedence over the static externality of the spatial 
continuum (see also Rosen 1994, 2004a). One of the most explicit formulations of pro-
cess dimensionality is found in the notion of depth advanced by the phenomenological 
philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1964). This idea provides us with an insight into 
dimension that permits us to surpass the limits of classico-modernism and arrive at a rad-
ically recursive understanding of space that is well suited for expressing the Kleinian dia-
lectic of continuity and discontinuity. 
 By way of introducing Merleau-Ponty’s depth dimension, let us consider in greater 
detail the traditional dichotomy between the objects contained in space and their spatial 
container, or, as Plato put it, between “that which becomes [and] that in which it be-
comes” (1965: 69). A visible form “becomes,” whereas that “in which it becomes” is “in-
visible and formless” (1965: 70). Whatever changes may transpire in the objects that “be-
come,” however they may be transformed, the containing space itself does not change. 
Indeed, for there to be change, there must be difference, contrast, dialectical opposition of 
some kind. But the point-elements that make up the classical continuum, rather than en-
tailing opposition, involve mere juxtaposition. Unextended and thus devoid of inner 
structure, the elements of space possess no gradations of depth; no shading, texture, or 
nuance; no contrasts or distinctions of any sort. Instead of expressing the dialectical in-
terplay of shadow and light, space itself is all light, as it were. A condition of “total expo-
sure” prevails for the point-elements of the continuum, since these elements, having no 
interior recesses, must be said to exist solely “on the outside.” All that can be said of the 
relations among such eviscerated beings is what Heidegger said: the points of classical 
space are “‘outside-of-one-another’” (1927/1962: 481). So, rather than actively engaging 
each other as the beings that are contained in space seem to do, the densely packed ele-
ments of the classical container sit inertly side by side, like identical beads on a string. 
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In fact, even though the beings that dwell in such a space can be described as “ac-
tively engaged,” we have seen that the quality of their interaction is affected by the con-
text in which they are embedded: since the continuum is constituted by sheer externality, 
the relations among its inhabitants must also be external. Classical dynamics are essen-
tially mechanistic; instead of involving a full-fledged dialectic of opposition and identity 
wherein beings influence each other from core to core, influence is exerted in a more su-
perficial fashion, “only through some kind of external contact” (Bohm 1980: 173). We 
may say then that classical space contains dialectical process in such a way that it exter-
nalizes it, divesting it of its depth and vitality. 
It is the classico-modernist view of space that Merleau-Ponty calls into question. 
What he demonstrates is that the spatial continuum appearing to contain dialectical pro-
cess actually originates from it. 
In his essay “Eye and Mind,” Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the “absolute positivity” of 
traditional Cartesian space (1964: 173). For Descartes, space simply is there; possessing 
no folds or nuances, it is the utterly explicit openness, the sheer positive extension that 
constitutes the field of strictly external relations wherein unambiguous measurements can 
be made. Merleau-Ponty speaks of 
 
this space without hiding places which in each of its points is only what it is....Space is in-
itself; rather, it is the in-itself par excellence. Its definition is to be in itself. Every point of 
space is and is thought to be right where it is—one here, another there; space is the evidence 
of the “where.” Orientation, polarity, envelopment are, in space, derived phenomena inextri-
cably bound to my presence [thus “merely subjective”]. Space remains absolutely in itself, 
everywhere equal to itself, homogeneous; its dimensions, for example, are interchangeable. 
(1964: 173) 
 
Merleau-Ponty concludes that, for Descartes, space is a purely “positive being, outside all 
points of view, beyond all latency and all depth, having no true thickness” (1964: 174). 
Challenging the Cartesian view, Merleau-Ponty insists that the dialectical features of 
perceptual experience (“[o]rientation, polarity, [and] envelopment”) are not merely sec-
ondary to a space that itself is devoid of such features. He begins his own account of spa-
tiality by exploring the paradoxical interplay of the visible and invisible, of identity and 
difference, that is characteristic of true depth: 
 
The enigma consists in the fact that I see things, each one in its place, precisely because they 
eclipse one another, and that they are rivals before my sight precisely because each one is in 
its own place. Their exteriority is known in their envelopment and their mutual dependence 
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in their autonomy. Once depth is understood in this way, we can no longer call it a third di-
mension. In the first place, if it were a dimension, it would be the first one; there are forms 
and definite planes only if it is stipulated how far from me their different parts are. But a first 
dimension that contains all the others is no longer a dimension, at least in the ordinary sense 
of a certain relationship according to which we make measurements. Depth thus understood 
is, rather, the experience of the reversibility of dimensions, of a global “locality”—
everything in the same place at the same time, a locality from which height, width, and depth 
[the classical dimensions] are abstracted. (1964: 180) 
 
Speaking in the same vein, Merleau-Ponty characterizes depth as “a single dimensionali-
ty, a polymorphous Being,” from which the Cartesian dimensions of linear extension de-
rive, and “which justifies all [Cartesian dimensions] without being fully expressed by 
any” (1964: 174). The dimension of depth is “both natal space and matrix of every other 
existing space” (1964: 176). 
Merleau-Ponty goes on to observe that primal dimensionality must be understood as 
self-containing. This is illustrated through a discussion of contemporary art, and, in par-
ticular, the work of Paul Cézanne: “Cézanne knows already what cubism will repeat: that 
the external form, the envelope, is secondary and derived, that it is not that which causes 
a thing to take form, that this shell of space must be shattered, this fruit bowl broken” 
(1964: 180). In breaking the “shell,” one disrupts the classical representation of objects in 
space. Merleau-Ponty asks: 
 
[W]hat is there to paint, then? Cubes, spheres, and cones...? Pure forms which have the so-
lidity of what could be defined by an internal law of construction...? Cézanne made an ex-
periment of this kind in his middle period. He opted for the solid, for space—and came to 
find that inside this space, a box or container too large for them, the things began to move, 
color against color; they began to modulate in instability. Thus we must seek space and its 
content as together. (1964: 180) 
 
The work of Cézanne is Merleau-Ponty’s primary example of the exploration of depth as 
originary dimension. The foregoing passage describes Cézanne’s discovery that primal 
dimensionality is not space taken in abstraction from its content, but is the unbroken flow 
from container to content. It is in this sense of the internal mediation of container and 
content that Cézanne’s depth dimension is self-containing. 
Merleau-Ponty also makes it clear that the primal dimension engages embodied sub-
jectivity: the dimension of depth “goes toward things from, as starting point, this body to 
which I myself am fastened” (1964: 173). In commenting that, “there are forms and defi-
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nite planes only if it is stipulated how far from me their different parts are” (180; italics 
mine), Merleau-Ponty is conveying the same idea. A little later, Merleau-Ponty goes fur-
ther: 
 
The painter’s vision is not a view upon the outside, a merely “physical-optical” relation with 
the world. The world no longer stands before him through representation; rather, it is the 
painter to whom the things of the world give birth by a sort of concentration or coming-to-
itself of the visible. Ultimately the painting relates to nothing at all among experienced 
things unless it is first of all “autofigurative.”....The spectacle is first of all a spectacle of it-
self before it is a spectacle of something outside of it. (1964: 181) 
 
In this passage, the painting of which Merleau-Ponty speaks, in drawing upon the origi-
nary dimension of depth, recursively draws in upon itself. Painting of this kind is not 
merely a signification of what is other, but a concrete self-signification that undercuts the 
external boundary between signifier and signified. 
In sum, the phenomenological dimension of depth as described by Merleau-Ponty is 
(1) the “first” dimension, inasmuch as it is the source of the Cartesian dimensions, which 
are idealizations of it; it is (2) a self-containing dimension, not merely a container for 
contents that are taken as separate from it; and it is (3) a dimension that blends subject 
and object concretely, rather than serving as a static staging platform for the objectifica-
tions of a detached subject. In realizing depth, we surpass the concept of space as but an 
inert container and come to understand it as an aspect of an indivisible cycle of action in 
which container, contained, and “uncontained”—space, object, and subject—are integral-
ly incorporated. 
 
 The work of Merleau-Ponty provides us with an insight into the nature of the “added 
dimension” that is required for the Kleinian signification of radical recursion. It would 
not be enough to say that the Klein bottle makes use of the dimension of depth to realize 
its dialectic of continuity and discontinuity—not if “makes use” connotes the operation of 
a model employing a containing medium to signify a meaning external to itself. It is per-
haps more accurate to say that the Klein bottle is the depth dimension. For, rather than 
being a model contained as object-in-space, the Klein bottle—grasped in terms of 
depth—is the inseparability of object, space, and subject, the unbroken circulation of the-
se intimated by Merleau-Ponty. 
 It is the unique hole in the Klein bottle that plays the pivotal role. This loss in conti-
nuity is necessary. One certainly could make a hole in the torus, or in any other object in 
three-dimensional space, but such discontinuities would not be necessary inasmuch as 
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these objects could be fully assembled in space without rupturing them. It is clear that 
whether an object like the torus is cut open or left intact, the closure of the space contain-
ing that object will not be brought into question; in rendering such an object discontinu-
ous, we do not affect the assumption that the space in which it is embedded is a continu-
um. Indeed, we have seen that the divisibility of an ordinary object derives from the infi-
nite divisibility of the continuum itself. With the Klein bottle it is different. Its disconti-
nuity does challenge the continuity of three-dimensional space as such, for the necessity 
of the hole in the bottle indicates that space is unable to contain the bottle the way ordi-
nary objects appear containable. We know that for the Kleinian “object” to be brought to 
completion, assembled without a hole, an “added dimension” is required, and I am pro-
posing that the dimension to be engaged is that of Merleau-Pontean depth (assuming we 
do not wish merely to skip over the hole by a continuity-maintaining act of abstraction, as 
in the standard mathematical stratagem for dealing with the Klein bottle). 
In the depth dimension, while the hole in the Klein bottle is no mere breach in an ob-
ject in space, neither is it simply a rupture in space per se that corresponds to the subject. 
Rather, the Kleinian “hole” is in fact a dialectical (w)hole resulting from an act of self-
intersection wherein the purported object does the “impossible”: it passes unbrokenly 
through itself, and, in so doing, flows backward into its own subjective ground (in Mer-
leau-Ponty’s terms, it is “autofigurative”). Elsewhere, I noted the resemblance of the 
Klein bottle to the hermetic vessel of old alchemy (Rosen 1995).  The design of the en-
igmatic vessel is essentially that of the uroboros, the serpent that consumes itself by 
swallowing its own tail.  To contain itself, the serpent must intersect itself, an operation 
requiring a hole (corresponding to the opening that is its mouth).  The hole in the Klein 
bottle is of this sort.  It is neither solely a hole in a container, nor a hole in that which it 
contains, but the hole produced by the recursive act of self-containment that integrates the 
container with its contents in this way giving (w)holeness. 
The Kleinian process of self-containment enacted through the dimension of depth is 
surely no trivial recursion, no regression of meaning to simple self-identity. The Klein 
bottle refers to itself, but it also makes reference to what is other and a boundary is 
crossed. Of course, the boundary in question is not of the exterior sort so familiar to us; 
instead it is paradoxical, a boundary that is not a boundary (see Neuman, this issue of 
SEED, and Rosen 1997, 2004a). In passing through Kleinian depths from self to other 
(subject to object, the discontinuous to the continuum), we cross over the boundary to the 
“far side,” yet at once remain on the “near side.” In this way, while the self-other distinc-
tion is not just abrogated, the supremacy of this distinction is overcome and we realize a 
harmony of self and other so intimate that the prior meanings of these terms are trans-
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muted. The erstwhile categorical purity of self and other is supplanted by an odd uroboric 
hybrid, a “hermaphroditic” fusion wherein self and other, though assuredly different, are 
one and the same. This profoundly paradoxical manner of self-reference is what I mean 
by radical recursion. 
 
 
5 SEMIOTIC POSTSCRIPT 
 
The subtlety of the notion of radical recursion has not been exhausted by what I have 
written above. I will note another layer of meaning before I conclude. 
 Consider the words “Klein bottle.” Although these signifiers point to the depth-
dimensional structure that embodies the paradox of radical self-signification, the signifi-
ers themselves—“K-l-e-i-n” and “b-o-t-t-l-e”—are but arbitrarily devised, conventionally 
agreed upon tokens that refer to their content in a merely external manner. These one-
dimensional typographic marks appearing on the two-dimensional surface of this page 
obviously fall short of tangibly delivering the three-dimensional Kleinian depth they sig-
nify. To the extent that “unmotivated” conventional marks constitute the primary mode of 
signification for this text, the old division between signifier and signified will be upheld 
and the meaning of the Klein bottle will remain an abstraction. 
In seeking to close the gap between signifier and signified, it might be feasible to 
place greater emphasis on our two-dimensional images of the Klein bottle (Figs. 2 and 3), 
or, better still, to work with a full three-dimensional model of this paradoxical structure (a 
model can be constructed with a flexible length of tubing such as that illustrated in Fig. 
3). However, it should be clear by now that for the Klein bottle to be fully dimensioned, 
our model cannot be limited to an object in three-dimensional space. The Klein bottle 
must be realized in Merleau-Pontian depth. To this end, rather than regarding the Klein 
bottle as but an object appearing before us, something “out there” in space that we see 
and can handle, we must resist this compulsion of naïve realism and take the bottle as 
something that we read. What I am suggesting is that, while the Klein bottle cannot be 
actualized in the abstract universal medium of words alone, neither can it be brought to 
fruition as but a particular concrete thing; to be realized in depth, it must be realized as a 
hybrid of word and thing (a “general thing”; Merleau-Ponty 1968: 139), as a “tangible 
word” or iconic text. In the capacity of iconic sign, the Klein bottle can serve to “moti-
vate” the process of signification by raising it from one-dimensional arbitrariness to a ful-
ly committed three-dimensional intercourse of signifier and signified. 
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In reading our iconic Kleinian text, we must of course read its hole. Instead of inter-
preting the hole as a gap in an ordinary object contained in space, we are to read it as an 
opening to a “higher dimension,” and read that dimension “autofiguratively,” grasping it 
as the prereflective source of our very own reading. The hole then becomes a (w)hole that 
we actualize in depth as we pass unbrokenly from text back to subtext in a uroboric act of 
radical recursion. Here the Klein bottle signifies radical recursion by signifying itself. Or 
in Peircian terms, we may say with semiotician Paul Ryan that the Klein bottle is a “sign 
of itself” (1993: 345–347). 
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